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Wage indexation and industrial relations: 
a comparison of recent experience in Israel and 
Australia 
Amira Galin and Russell D. Lansbury* 
Australia and /s~ael both have centralised machinery for the determination of national 
wage policy. In A .ustralia, the Conciliation and Arbitration ~Commission holds an .annual 
national wage hearing. In Israel, a natio.nal framework agreement for determininK wage 
levels is bargaine,d and signed by the par.ties every two y .ears. In addition, both countries 
have periodical a"angements for adjusting wages as a result of movement in the cost of 
living. This .article compares the indexation a"angements of the two countries and analyses 
their impact on industrial relatio.ns. 
In trodu~ction 
Rapid economic change, a relatively high rate of inflation and increasing industrial 
unrest have been common features of life in the advan~ced industrialised countries in recent 
years. A number of these countries have sought to minimise fluctuations in real income, 
while maintaining centralised control over ·wage movem~ents, through the indexation of 
wages or personal taxation or a combination of both. Israel and Australia are countries 
with a long history of ~experimentation with various fonns of wage indexation. A 
comparison of th~eir experience, particularly in re~cent years, provides an opportunity to 
analyse the impact of indexation policies on th~e industrial relations syst~em. 
It is notoriously difficult to compare wages policy and industrial relations between 
countries which have different ~economic, social and political environments. Neverth·eless, 
ther~e exist a number of similarities between the industrial relations systems in Australia 
and Israel. First, both have highly centralised systems of wage determination. In Australia, 
thls is due to the role of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission in the administration 
of the national wages policy. In Israel, centralisation is the product of the national frame-
work agreement which is negotiated every two years betw~een the Federation of Labour 
(the Histadruth) and the National Employers Federation. In both countries, however, 
considerable differences ~exist betw~een minimum wages levels which are agreed centrally 
and the a~ctual wages which are paid above the awards (in Australia) or in ~excess of the 
agreement (in Israel}. Secondly, lik~e many other advanced industrialised ~countries .. 
Australia and Israel hav.e experienced a growing rate of industrial disputation in r~ecent 
years. The mass media in both countries assign considerable importanc~e to the incidence 
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of strikes and often exaggerate the economic costs involved in such actions. Thus 
industrial unrest is a subject of public debate and often a central issue in national elections: 
These common experiences make the comparison of wage indexation policies in each 
country of considerable interest. 
The purpose of this paper is not to provide detailed description of wage indexation 
arrangements within Australia and Israel in fme detail, which are readily available elsewhere 
(Galin, 1977 and Plowman, 1978), but rather to analyse their broad impact on industrial 
relations. 
The Australian Experience 
In Australia, the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission (as the main Federal 
tribunal) plays a central role in the deterntination and administration of wages policy. It is 
interesting to note, however, that the emergence of centralised wage policy machinery was 
largely an unplanned and unforeseen event. The tribunal was originally established for "the 
prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one 
state". The growth in the jurisdiction and status of the Federal tribunal was the result of 
early preference by unions for Federal awards, as well as a succession of liberal judicial 
interpretations of the Australian constitution which enabled this preference to be 
exercised. In 1921, the Federal tribunal, for the fust time, provided automatic adjustment 
of wages, in accordance with changes in the cost of living, in the belief that ''this would 
save expense, delay and uncertainty to the parties, and the time of the employers, 
employees and of the Court taken up at present in variations of awards to meet the cost 
of living" (Commonwealth Arbitrrltion Repon, 1921, p.716). This was affirnted by the full 
bench of the Arbitration Court in 1922 as a just and equitable system. In 1953, however, 
the Arbitration Court (as it was then known) abandoned the system of automatic cost of 
living adjustments on the grounds that they had been "an accelerating factor in the _rapid 
increase in prices which had affected Australia notably in the years 1951 and 1952" 
(Commonwealth Arbitration Report, 1953, p.532). 
The decision by the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission to introduce a new 
system of wage indexation in 1975 was the result of several factors. In 1967 the 
Commission abolished the long established system of a basic wage and margins in favour of 
a ''total award". A national minimum wage, representing the lowest wage pernaissable for a 
standard work week by any employee, was introduced at the same time. During the early 
1970's the Commission sought to improve the relative structure of award wages in different 
industries by attempting to bring award wages more closely into line with actual wages. It 
met with no success, however, and by 1973-74 the contribution of national wage cases to 
the total increases in the weighted average wage rate for males had declined to 19 percent. 
Unions bargained directly with employen for large over-award payments and the 
Commission's role in wage detea1nination beaune increasingly irrelevant (Lansbury, 1978). 
In the 1974 national wage case, both the Federal Labour Government and the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) argued for the reintroduction of automatic cost of living 
adjustment against the opposition of non-labour state governments and private employen. 
The unions proposed that all award wages be adjusted in line with the quarterly movement 
in the consumer price index (CPI) to achieve full indexation. The Australian government, 
on the other hand, proposed that a full percentage increase be added to all award rates up 
to the level of average weekly earnings, and a flat amount of increase be granted.to those 
above that level (known as "plateau percentage indexation"). 
In March 1975, after a long hearing, the Commission decided to grant full percentage 
indexation as part of a "package" of principles. It also issued guidelines on the principles 
and procedures of the wage fixing system under which it believed that indexation should 
operate. Essentially, these guidelines stated that no wage increase could be granted without 
the permission of the Commission. Apart from increases in the CPI, the only grounds on 
which wage increases could be justified were changes in productivity or work value (such 
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as the nature of work, skill and responsibility required), community catch-up, or the 
adjustment of rates to restore relativities. The guidelin~es also established the right of the 
Commission to determine the form of indexation at the end of each indexation period in 
the light of circumstances and th·e submissions of the parties. The Commission held 
quarterly indexation hearings from 1975 to 1978 but in Septen1ber 1978 this was changed 
to half-yearly intervals. Substantial compliance with the indexation guidelines were 
r~equired by both parties, especially the unions. The uncertainty surrounding the form 
of indexation and amount of increase, determined at each hearing., was intended to induce 
compliance by the parties and preserve the ~Commission's flexibility. The Commission has 
also used a variety of wage adjustm·ents from full percentage indexation during 1975 to a 
mixture of mainly partial percentage and flat in ~creases between 1976 and 1979. By 
establishing these guidelines, the Commission developed a new set of rules for the parties in 
the industrial relations system while reserving the leading role for itself. Stability in wages 
and centralised control of the wage system was preserved as long as the parties complied 
with the rules. Since the introduction of wage indexation in 1975, there have been pro-
gressive r·efmements of the principles; the main change being to half yearly rather than 
quarterly h·earings. Th~e Commission has made several attempts to achieve consensus among 
the parties concerning th·e principles of wage indexation mainly by calling th~em togeth·er 
to discuss wage fLxation problems. Unfortunately, however., this desired consensus has not 
been achieved and growing areas of disagreement between the parties in 1979 thr~eaten·ed 
the future of the indexation system. It was argued, by June 1979, that the gap between the 
parties has significantly wid·ened so that "one side ( want~ed) indexation with restraints 
while the other side (wanted) restraints without indexation". The Commission appeared to 
have reached the brink of announcing the abandonment of the indexation syst~em. 
At the end of 1980, the Commission suspended indexation hearings on the grounds that 
the parties were divided in their attitude towards the syste·m and had not complied with its 
requirements. The Commission convened an inquiry into the future of the wage fixation 
system and invited submissions from all interested parties. Somewhat surprisingly, only the 
National Employers' Industrial Council (NEIC) called for a radical ~change to the indexa-
tion system. It proposed annual wage h~earings where productivity movements, rather than 
the CPI, would be used as the indicator of wage movements. The NEIC also suggested that 
in every alternative year the Commission should conduct an inquiry into ·work value, ~con­
ditions and relativities. On the other hand, the NEIC declared itself in full support of the 
centralised wage fixation with the Commission playing a central role. The Federal govern-
ment argued for maintaining the twice yearly hearings with the first automatically passing 
on 80 percent of the CPI for the December and March quarters. At the second hearing, the 
remaining 20 percent plus the CPI for the June and September quarters would be 
considered, discounting Government induced price rises and the impact of non-compliance. 
The ACTU pursued its long-standing policy of full quarterly wage indexation. 
In April 1981, the Commission delivered its decision on the futur~e of wage indexation 
in which it proposed a new set of principles similar to those advocated by the Federal 
government (Australian Conciliation and .Arbitration Commission, 1981 ). Under the new 
system, the Commission would hold six monthly :bearings . At the March hearing, it would 
adjust a·ward wages and salaries for 80 percent of the December and March quarterly move-
m·ents of th~e CPl. 'The following September it would consider adjusting award wages to 
account for the r·emaining 20 percent from December and March as weU as CPI movements 
in the June and September quarters. The Commission noted that it would also take into 
consideration changes in productivity and the state of the economy. Other grounds on 
which wage increases could be justified included changes in work value, the r ~esolution of 
anomalies or inequities in the wage structur·e, the adjustment of allowances, service incre-
ments, first awards and extensions of existing awards to new areas of work. The most 
controversial aspect of the Commission's judgement was its opposition to productivity bar· 
gaining, which had been actively pursued by some unions in order to achieve a shorter 
working week. Although the Commission had lent its support to the concept of productiv-
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ity bargaining in 1978, it now argued that such an approach to wage fixation could no 
longer co-exist in a centralised system against the background of a general campaign for 
shorter working hours. It remains to be seen whether the Commission is able to prevent the 
continuation of such a development.• 
The Israeli Experience 
Wage indexation was introduced in Israel by the British mandatory government in 1942 
on the recommendation of the "Joint Committee on Problems of Wage Adjustments". 
The following principles were established. Fint, a Cost of living Allowance (COLA) would 
be paid according to changes in the CPl. Secondly, the timing and magnitude of COLA 
payments would be subject to negotiations. Thirdly, no allowances would be paid on wages 
which exceeded a given maximum or ceiling. Since that time, COLA has become a 
perrnanent feature of the Israeli industrial relations system. It has become subject to 
centralised collective bargaining between the Histadruth (the Israeli Federation of Labour), 
the Israeli employers federations, and the lsraeH government. 
Since wage indexation has been subject to collective bargaining, several changes have 
been introduced by the parties over the years. The timing of COLA payments, for example, 
was changed from every three to every six months in 1957, and then to every 12 months 
(i.e. an annual COLA payment). In 1975 it was changed back to every six months, and to 
every three months in 1979. In 1981, due to rapidly rising level of inflation, the govern-
ment introduced monthly COLA payments. The ceiling has also been subject to frequent 
changes. The maximum wage above which no COLA is allowed to be paid has not been 
linked to any index and has been changed sporadically. Other features of the wage indexa-
tion system have also been changed. Until the 1970s, the method of calculating the CPI as 
a basis for the COLA had been changed many times. Since then, however, the parties have 
reached an agreement as to the appropriate CPI, and the indexation agreement of 1975 
established an explicit partial linkage of 70 percent to the CPl. However, this was ch8nged 
once more to 80 percent and in early 1981 the parties are almost ready to agree on full 
indexation, or 100 percent linkage to the CPl. The taxation of COLA has also been 
changed. Until 1975, it was agreed that COLA payments should be considered as an 
integral part of the wage and thus should be subject to income tax. 
The indexation agreement of 1975 was supposed to set some more consistent and 
realistic guidelines for indexation. At the time, these guidelines seemed to be completely 
acceptable to all parties. The 1975 agreement established a long-te11n indexation agreement 
(for four years) under which COLA was to be paid automatically every half year. Only 70 
percent of the CPI rise was to be awarded and no "ceiliftg" or other tid hoc adjustments 
were to be applied. The 1975 agreement was supposed to be a turning point in the Israeli 
histoty of indexation. The long-te11n agreement was supposed to prevent problems arising 
from frequent negotiations over COLA payments. The compensation should have been 
paid as soon as possible after changes in the cost of living, to avoid a gap between price 
rises and COLA payments. The expUcit partial linkage to the CPI was intended to preserve 
the government's economic policy. It was also designed to avoid the payment of compen-
sation for inflation caused by rises in import prices (which are meant to encourage export 
and reduce import consumption). It also seemed, at the time, that partial linkage to the 
CPI was preferable to compUcated arrangements such as "ceiling clauses" and/or ad hoc 
adjustments of the CPI which cause partial linkage anyway. Since all three parties -
Histadruth, employers and the government - appeared to have accepted the new 
principles, there were high expectations that the new COLA arrangement would provide 
greater wage stability. These expectations were not realised, however, and the parties have 
found it difficult to comply with the guidelines. 
Despite the automatic character of the arrangement, bargaining has continued over the 
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f"orm which COLA is to take, and since 1978 there have also been negotiations ~concerning 
the timing of COLA payments. One of the main reasons for not ~complying with the agr~ee­
ment guidelines stems from the nature of COLA payments during a time of rapid inflation. 
The higher the inflation, the higher the part of COLA payment in any increase of wages. 
This makes it difficult for employers in weaker industries, to pay wage increases beyond 
the COLA, since the COLA payments themselves become a substantial part of the work 
cost. In order to avoid redundancies, especiaUy in weak~er industries, the Histadruth has not 
been permitted to seek wage in ~creases beyond COLA payments. The Histadruth, th~erefore, 
has sought to demonstrate its bargaining power mainly by bargaining over the magnitude 
or timing of the COLA. Any automatic arrangement of COLA would thus reduce its power 
over its constituents and weaken its bargaining power. It should also be noted that in Israel 
COLA is paid as an integral part of the wage and, if paid automatically, workers would 
tend to forget th~e unions' role in this arrangement. For similar reasons, the ceiling on 
COLA has not b ~een abolished. Since C~OLA payments have become a growing burden over 
tim~e, both private employers and the government have an interest in maintaining the 
"ceiling" and thus reducing the "cost" of COLA. Th~e Histadruth was willing to accept the 
ceiling as it did not wish to appear to be protecting the position of the higher income 
groups. At the same time, however, the llistadruth sought to maintain its bargaining ability 
over the "ceiling" issue. Thus, in effect, the indexation agreement at 1975 has not been 
carried out and the expectations that COLA would help to stabilise wages has not been 
r~ealised. 
At times of rapid and unpredictable inflation, as currently experienced in Israel, COLA 
becomes the central axis around which wage expectations gravitat~e. The workers' high 
expectations regarding th~e real wage increase from C~OLA result in frustration when the 
actu~l payments are made. The increase in wages due to ~COLA between 1975 to 1980 has 
been less than the increase in the ~CPI on some occassions, while at other times it has been 
more. This is due mainly to lags in adjustments. When the inflation rate is high, six-
monthly and even three-monthly CPI averaging procedures leave a gap between the total 
price rise and the amount of the COLA payment. As a result, it is hard to predict the rate 
of COLA compensation for the change in the CPl. Naturally, dissatisfaction occurs for the 
average wage earner when compensation is less than ~expected. The fact that at times the 
compensation is higher than the change in the CPI, does not alleviat~e this. Rather .. it results 
in incr~eased levels of expectation for the wage earner and greater disappointment when he 
is only partially compensated the next time. Moreover, the ~changes in the wage indexation 
system do not provide workers and ~employers with a stable environment in which to plan 
their future activities. In th~e face of the high and rapid inflation, whlch amounted to more 
than 130 percent in 1980, the various ~changes in the indexation system seem simply to be 
"whistling in the dark". However, what the consequ~ences of inflation without wage ind~ex­
ation would have been remains an open question. 
From Consensus to Disagreement: 
Attitudes Towards Indexation in Australia and Israel Since 1975 
Despite the differences between their industrial relations systems and forms of wage 
fixation, the attitudes of the parties towards wage fixation in Australia and Israel have been 
similar in several respects. The unions, employers and governments in each country broadly 
agree that some form of wage indexation is d~esirable in principle. Th~ey have failed to reach 
a consensus. however, on the way in which indexation should be applied in practic~e. 
Union Attitudes 
In both countries, the union movement has basically favour~ed indexation. It has 
provided an "easy" way to preserve previous wage gains and to use them as a departure 
point from which to advance future demands. In the face of severe e ~conomic problems, 
indexation has provided a convenient method whereby unions could seek wage increases 
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without undue damage to their public ~ma&e. It has difficult for entployers or govern-
ments to oppose the preservation of employees' ltalldards of liYiaa, even during difficult 
economic times. Moreover. by claimins that wqe indexatioa enhances the stability of 
industrial relations. unions can domollltrate a sense of responsibility and concern for the 
well-being of the national economy. 
The union movements ia both Israel and Australia have tended to .support forms of 
wage indexation which employees for in the CPI but also allow for 
additional wage increases where it can be shown that changes in the nature or method of 
work have raised the level of productivity. The unions have also sought the introduction of 
tax indexation as well as restrictions on price by government. The unions fear, 
however, that a sustained period of lea than fuU wage indexation will result in a reduction 
of real wages. They have, therefore, resisted limitations on their right to seek wage 
increases outside of indexation, albeit in exceptional circumstances. 
Employers 'Attitudes 
Employers' associations in both countries have been less than enthusiastic with the way 
in which indexation has operated, even thoush they have tolerated its existence. The pro-
liferation of employer bodies in Austnlia (estimated to be greater than 700) make it 
difficult to summarise the employers' penpective, even though the National Employers' 
Industry Council doer' officially represent Australian entployers before the Arbitration 
Commission. Nevertheless, Australian employers share a concern with their Israeli counter-
parts that increases in their costs, due to wage indexation, cannot always be recovered · 
through price increases. Employen tend to complain that wage indexation has resulted in a 
redistribution of income from profits to wages and thereby added to pressures on employ-
ment levels. Yet partial indexation, which results in wage restraint, can achieve wage 
stability and facilitate long-ternt planning. 
Government Attitudes 
Unless there had been strong gowmment support for wage indexation at the time of its 
introduction, it is unlikely that it would have survived long either in Australia or Israel. 
When the current systems of indexation were introduced in 197 5, the Labour governments 
then in power in both Australia and Israel sought to reduce inflation by strengthening their 
centralised systems of wage ftxation, while also seeking to reduce the level of industrial 
disputation over wage issues. However, the introduction of indexation in both countries 
coincided with new inflationary pressures which arose from a combination of · oil 
prices and a widespread economic recession throughout the Western market economies. 
In Australia, the government faced increases in both inflation and une1nployment. Israel 
experienced much higher levels of inflation although less unemployment. The Labour 
governments which introduced the new systems of indexation in both Australia and Israel, 
each subsequently lost political office. Although the subsequent native governments, 
in each country, were less enthusiastic about the indexation of wages, they stlll support 
the indexation system. 
Wage Indexation and Industrial R•tio• Problems 
As noted previously, a number of industrial relations problems have a in connection 
with the operation of the wap Indexation system. While many of these problems are 
common to Australia and Israel, others are unique to each country. 
Wage Increases Above Award Levell orOunide the lndemtion Agreement 
The awards made by the Concililtion and Arbitration Commission in Australia, and 
wage levels negotiated within the ''framework aareement" in Israel, only specify minimum 














Wage Indexation and Industrial Relations 19 
employees receive in excess of the rates which are agreed under formal, ~centralised pro-
cedur~es. The gap betw~een the awards or the agreed fonual rates and the actual ' 'paid 
rates" is made up by over-award or over-agreement payments. These payments are usually 
regarded by both the wage earners and their unions as an int~egral part of their wages . 
However, in most cases, over~ward or over-agreement payments are not subject to indexa-
tion. 
In the absence of indexation, the over-award part of th~e individual's wage does not 
retain its value in relation to the other part. Hence, under indexation, dissatisfaction occurs 
among workers who are accustomed to over-award wages and experience a decline in their 
differentials with respect to other work~ers on award wages. Recently, some Australian 
unions sought and received indexation of over-award payments by the Commission. This 
development was opposed by employers sin~ce in introduced further multiplier ~effects into 
their wage costs. Over-award payments are negotiated and achieved in accordance with the 
capacity of certain employers to pay. Thus, indexation of payments which are in excess of 
either awards or agreements result in a widening of wage differentials. This, in turn, 
encourages a new spiral of "'catch-up" claims by unions whose members feel that their 
relativities have been disturbed . 
The Rigidity ,and Flexibility of Indexation Arrangements 
From an industrial relations point of view, one of the most important features of wage 
indexation is its flexibility. Any indexation arrangement provides mutual expectations 
between th~e parties involved. The more flexible the indexation system, the less predictable 
will be its operation. Conversely, a highly rigid arrangement will restrict the parties' roo.m 
to manoeuver, especially in negotiations. .However, since the parties have different 
objectives and interests in the indexation arrangement, it is necessary to provide some 
flexibility in order that they can bargain with each other and obtain compromises where 
necessary. If the system is too rigid, and restricts the parties to fixed positions, wage 
indexation will become ineffective in the dynamic arena of industrial relations. In Isaac's 
words: "rules should be foJtnulated in a way so that they ar~e neither too automatic, 
narrow and rigid, nor too broad and flexible. Industrial relations need to be accommodated 
by some flexibility in the rules to meet special and unforeseen circumstances, but too 
much play destroys the whole concept of rules". (Isaac, 1977, p.l9) 
In Australia, the guidelines set by the Commission for the introdu~ction of wage indexa-
tion were quite rigid. However, the lack of automatic increases and the uncertainty as to 
the form of indexation which would be granted after each hearing, has introduced some 
flexibility into the system. Such flexibility was meant to assist the Commission in achieving 
a suitable compromise between the often conflicting interests of the parties. However, the 
parties themselves felt restricted by th~e guid~elines and found it difficult to comply with 
rules established by the ~Commission to ensure the continuation of indexation. Similarly, 
the 1975 automatic indexation arrangements in Israel did not leave the parties sufficient 
room to manoeuver except in the colJe,ctive bargaining sessions which took place once in 
every two years. As a result, the parties eventually abandon~ed the process. During periods 
of rapid economic change and rising inflation, as experienced by Israel in recent years, the 
indexation arrangements have provided neither sufficient flexibility nor a stable 
framework. 
The Politics of Wage Indexation 
In December 1975, the coalition government of the Liberal and National Country 
Parties was returned to Federal office in Australia after three years of rule by th~e Labour 
Party. Lik~e their Labour predecessors, the new conservative government opposed the 
granting of fuU indexation mainly on the grounds of the depressed state of the econotny. 
Later, it also argued that non-compliance by the unions with the indexation guidelin~es 
provided an additional reason for the Commission to limit th~e extent of wage increases. 
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The government also sought to lilnit indexation hearings to once a year and, in 1978, the 
Commission changed fron1 quarterly to half-yearly hea.rings. As part of its election 
campaign in 1975., the Liberal and National Country Parties promised to introduce tax 
indexation on obtaining governn1ent. Although the report of a Committee of Inquiry into 
Inflation and Taxation was publish~ed in May 1975, recom1nending the introduction of 
personal tax indexation, the government has so far failed to take major action in this field 
(Inflation and Taxation, 1975). 
In subsequent years, relationships between the Australian govern1nent and the 
Com1nission have b~ecome increasingly strained over the issue of wage fixation, especially 
on occasions when th·e tribunal has granted full indexation. While consistently arguing for 
either partial or no wage increases at indexation hearings, the government has claimed that 
the Commission should accept economic considerations as the prime determinant of the 
level of any wage adjustment it awards. For its part, the Commission has replied that it is 
''not an arm of the Government's economic policy. It is an independent body and is 
required under the Act to act according to equity, good conscience and the substantial 
merits of the case.". Nevertheless, the Australian government is in the difficult position 
where it is constrained by the constitution from being able to control wages and prices, 
and must adjust to the Commission's decisions. Needless to say, however, the Commission 
usually pays considerable attention to the Australian government's views, while vigorously 
defending its independent position . 
When the conservative Licud governn1ent assumed office in Israel during 1977, it did 
not immediately challenge the indexation system which had been curtured by its Labour 
predecessor. Wage indexation in Israel is based upon an agreement reached between the 
Histadruth and the Israeli Employers' Federation, which is made initially in the private 
sector but is subject to an extension order by the government which ensures that it is 
applied to the whole economy. Early in l980, the Licud government proposed that full 
COLA pay~nents b·e made to wage earners each month subject to th·e condition that no 
other wage demands be presented, except those based upon increased productivity. Both 
the Histadruth and the Employers had reservations about the proposal but raised no formal 
objections. Observers believe, however, that the new arrangements are too rigid and that 
the parties are unlikely to give total adherence to the government's policy. Nevertheless, 
while the government in Israel (as in Australia) cannot force either the unions or employers 
to comply with its wage policies, it plays a most influential role in determining the frame-
work within which the parties are required to operate. 
Indexation and Industrial Unrest 
The past decade in both Israel and Australia has been marked by increased industrial 
disputation. The number of days lost due to strikes, per thousand people employed, has 
been far greater in Australia than Israel. Unfortunately, however, the methods of defming 
and collecting statistics on strikes differ consid·erably between the two countries and 
caution must be exercised when seeking to make comparisons. There were also significant 
domestic issues which occurred within both countries during the past d~ecade; wars in 
Israel and political strikes associated with a change in government in Australia, which 
distorted the strike statistics. Nevertheless it would appear that there has been greater 
stability in the industrial relations environtnent within both countries since the introduc-
tion of their current systems of indexation in 1975. 
It is difficult to discern any clear trends in terms of the nature of strike activity under 
indexation. The average length of a strike in both Australia and Israel has oscillated 
between two and three days during the past d~ecade. It is interesting to note, however, that 
about two-thirds of strikes are typically three days or less in both Australia and Israel 
despite the fact that Australia has cotnpulsory arbitration while in Israel it is voluntary. _ 
The average man days lost per strike since the introduction of current forms of indexa-
tion indicates opposite trends in Australia and Israel. There has been a dramatic rise in man 
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days lost per strike in Israel since 1974 despite indexation, although it has not yet sur-
passed the record levels of 1973. In Australia, the trend has been in the opposite direction. 
A sharp increase in the average man days lost per strike in 1973 was followed by a decline. 
This trend, however, appears to have occurred despite indexation rather than because of 
its operation. Indeed, the man days lost due to strikes have been rising again since the 
1970s. 
The average number of persons involved in each strike since the introduction of ind~exa­
tion also appears to follow opposite trends in Australia and Israel. Within Israel, the average 
number of persons involved in each strike has in~creased steadily since 1974. The only 
exception to this trend was a slight decline between 1975 and 1976, w·hich may have 
indicated a temporary effect created by indexation. In Australia, the average number of 
strikers involved in each strike incr~eased over 1975 and 1976 but d~eclined thereafter. The 
high figures for 1976 were due to the one-day national strike called in protest at changes 
by the newly elected liberal National ~Country Party government to the national health 
system. Sin.ce the late 1970s however, the figur~es appear to be rising again. 
Finally, the causes of industrial disputes since 197 5 indicates furth~er differences 
between Australia and Israel. Comparisons based on these data are difficult as the infornta-
tion published in ~each country is imprecise and the defmitions of terms vary considerably 
(Bentley, 1980). Nevertheless, there appears to have been an incr·ease in the percentage of 
disputes due principally to wages and hours in Israel since the current form of indexation 
was introduced. While the percentage of disputes over working conditions and managerial 
policy has incr~eased at an even faster rate between 1'975 and 1977, it is still less than the 
proportion due to wage issues. The analysis is complicated, however, by the large propor-
tion of strikes due to ''other causes". In Australia, there was a marked decline in the 
proportion of disputes due mainly to wage issues between 197 5 and 1977 and an increase 
in disputes over conditions and managerial policy. It would appear, from these figures, that 
indexation in Australia had some dampening ·effect on wage demands, although they still 
account for more than half of the total man days lost due to strikes. In Israel, with the 
possible exception of 1976, indexation did not appear to reduce the proportion of wage 
related strikes. 
Conclusions 
The comparison of the effects of wage indexation on industrial relations in different 
countries, such as Israel and Australia, is difficult. This is due to a variety of factors; differ= 
ences in the systems of industrial relations in each country, the ·economic and political 
environment, and the forms of indexation which are practised. N~evertheless, as noted in 
this paper, th·ere are a number of interesting similarities between Australia and Israel. Both 
countries introduced their recent systems of wage indexation in 1975 and, although the 
specific arrangements varied considerably, there wer~e important common features. 
Recently there has been considerable dissatisfaction among most parties with the operation 
of wage indexation systems in each country. Several problem areas common to indexation 
in the two countries have been identified and discussed in this paper. They include wage 
increases granted above award levels or outside the indexation agr~eement, the rigidity and 
flexibility of indexation arrangements .. the political issues surrounding indexation, and the 
impact of indexation on levels of industrial unrest. It is ·clear, moreover, that wage indexa-
tion has not provided a panacea for economic or industrial relations in either Israel or 
Australia. 
In both Australia and Israel the govern1nent has played a leading if not dominant role 
in the indexation system. In Australia, the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission has 
administered the system and set guidelines for its continued operation and indeed it is 
clear that the introduction of indexation has r~estored authority to th·e Commission in the 
field of wage det~ermination. Y~et the Commission relies upon the willingness of unions and 
employ~ers to abide by its decisions. Above all, the Commission is strongly influenced by 
government ~economic policy, while seeking to preserve its independent and primary role 
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of preventing and settling industrial disputes. Although the Australian government has 
chided the Commission for not handing-down wage decisions which are consistent with its 
economic policy, changes in the operations of the indexation system have followed the 
broad direction of government submissions. Similarly, in Israel, the government of the day 
has been the dominant influence on the operation of indexation through its power over 
taxation and its ability to issue or withhold "extension orders" on agreements made 
between the Histadruth and the e1nployers. 
A major difference between the operation of indexation in Australia and Israel has been 
in terms of flexibility within each system. In Australia, the guidelines set by the 
Commission established clear but strict parameters for unions seeking wage increases. The 
Commission retained sufficient flexibility for itself, however, to ensure that the system 
survived. Various safety valves were used to grant unions increases due to changes in "work 
value" or "wage anomalies" and thereby reduce pressures on the system. By contrast, the 
parties in Israel were afforded less flexibility and were restricted to biennial collective 
bargaining sessions in order to obtain changes in the operation of the indexation system. 
By keeping the system so rigid, unions and employers were forced to reach ad hoc agree-
ments outside indexation, which undermined the system. 
Although the major parties in both the Australian and Israeli industrial relations sytems 
have all agreed at various times on the benefits to be gained from wage indexation in 
principle, they have found it difficult to agree on how the system should operate in 
practice. In both countries all parties have blamed each other for the failure of indexation 
to fulfil their highest hopes. In part, this is due to unrealistic expectations which were 
raised by some of the advocates for indexation. It also reflects, however, basic conflicts 
of interest which exist between the parties in industrial relations. While the Australian 
and Israeli experiences provide a cautionary lesson in the application of wage indexation 
policies, they also underline some important requirements for success. First, there needs 
to be substantial consensus among the parties concerning not only the principles but also 
on the ground rules of how indexation is to be applied. Secondly, there need to be clear 
guidelines on the operation of indexation combined with sufficient internal flexibility 
to enable the parties to bargain within an agreed framework. Thirdly, any system of 
indexation needs to be reviewed on a regular basis to ensure that it adequately serves the 
needs of all the parties involved. Certainly, the mere existence of a system of wage indexa-
tion, as witnessed in both Israel and Australia, has not be~n sufficient by itself to ensure 
wage stability or to reduce industrial disputation. 
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